The Effects of Consent Decrees on Local Legislative Immunity by Robertson, J. Robert
The Effects of Consent Decrees on Local
Legislative Immunity
J. Robert Robertsont
... you assert your ancient Privilege, and if the Lawyers do
not understand it, let them break it, at their perils . .. .
In a representative form of government, the legislator is "the
public voice;"2 the legislator speaks for the people. At the local
level in particular, this voice both initiates and pervades the delib-
erative process. Nonetheless, there are situations in which a local
lawmaking body will partially sidestep this role when it agrees,
through a consent decree, to legislate in a certain way. In such a
situation, a federal judge may be in a position to issue a contempt
order, including the threat of imprisonment, to a dissenting legisla-
tor who votes according to his or her perceived duty to the people
but against the decree. In a country governed by the people
through their representatives,3 judicial coercion of this kind raises
serious questions.
These questions bear on the issue of legislative immunity. In
United States v Brewster, Chief Justice Burger contrasted the ori-
gins of this immunity in England with its development in the
United States. He commented, "[tihere is nothing in our history,
for example, comparable to the imprisonment of a Member of Par-
liament in the Tower without a hearing .... ." Despite this asser-
tion, England and America actually differ little on the issue of im-
prisonment of legislators. In both countries, legislators have long
had strong safeguards in the law, dating back to the English re-
t B.A. 1977, Virginia Military Institute; J.D. Candidate 1990, The University of
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' Anchitell Grey, ed, 3 Debates of the House of Commons: 1667-1694 at 209 (Becket &
De Hondt, 1769) ("Grey"), statement in 1675 by Mr. Powle during the House of Commons
debate on an individual member's waiver of parliamentary privilege in the case of Shirley v
Fagg, 6 Howell's St Trials 1121 (House of Lords 1675).
1 Federalist 10 (Madison) in Benjamin Fletcher Wright, ed, The Federalist 129, 134
(Belknap/Harvard, 1961).
3 James Dewitt Andrews, ed, 2 The Works of James Wilson at 8 (Callaghan, 1896),
"The constitution of the United States ... rests solely.., on the great democratical princi-
ple of a representation of the people ......
4 408 US 501, 508 (1972).
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forms of the seventeenth century. Prior to those reforms, the En-
glish struggle for parliamentary privilege abounds with examples of
executive and judicial coercion of the legislative process. Acutely
aware of these abuses, the founders of the new government of the
United States guaranteed in the Constitution legislative privileges
that were already protected by the common law.5 Likewise, federal
and state common law, and in many cases the corresponding state
constitutions, assured the right of free legislative process at other
levels of government. But the privileges of municipal legislators
have recently come into question as the involvement of federal
government in local affairs has increased.
The imprisonment of members of Parliament mentioned by
Chief Justice Burger is comparable to a penalty imposed in a mod-
ern-day case involving the city of Yonkers, New York." In 1980, the
Justice Department filed a desegregation suit in the District Court
for the Southern District of New York. The case alleged inten-
tional racial segregation in housing and public schools by the City
of Yonkers and the Yonkers Board of Education.7 Five years later,
the district court found that the city and the board had deliber-
ately segregated both housing and public schools, and, in 1986, it
ordered significant relief.8 After losing its appeal, the city complied
with the school desegregation remedy,9 but balked at the housing
remedy order.10 This resistance ostensibly ended when the city
council finally assented to a consent decree on January 28, 1988.11
As part of the decree, the city agreed to adopt implementing legis-
lation that would include tax abatements, zoning changes, and a
package of incentives for local development. 2 The ensuing bar-
See text at notes 54-65.
' United States v Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 624 F Supp 1276 (S D NY 1985), aff'd 837 F2d
1181 (2d Cir 1987), cert denied, 108 S Ct 2821 (1988). Contempt order appealed in United
States v City of Yonkers, 856 F2d 444 (2d Cir 1988); stay granted for councilmen in Spal-
lone v United States, 109 S Ct 14 (1988); cert granted for councilmen in 109 S Ct 1337
(1989); cert denied for the city in Yonkers v United States, 1989 US LEXIS 1214. The
parties complied with the consent decree on September 10, 1988. Robert McFadden, Step-
ping Back From Fiscal and Political Crisis: What is Next for Yonkers?, NY Times 36 (Sept
11, 1988).
624 F Supp at 1288.
B United States v Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 635 F Supp 1538 (S D NY 1986) (public school
remedy); 635 F Supp 1577 (S D NY 1986) (housing remedy).
' McFadden, NY Times 36 (Sept 11, 1988) (cited in note 6).
10 856 F2d at 448 (the city at first defaulted and later refused to comply). See 635 F
Supp 1577 (Housing Remedy Order).
" 856 F2d at 448; (the city council voted to accept the decree on January 27, 1988; the
court entered judgment the following day).
12 Id at 449.
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mony did not last. The council not only failed to implement the
required legislation, it voted against a resolution indicating "com-
mitment to the implementation" of the consent judgment, the
housing remedy order, and the long term plan order.' s
On July 26, 1988, Judge Leonard Sand issued an order giving
the city one final opportunity to comply with the previous housing
remedy order.14 On August 2, after the city had failed to enact the
requisite legislation, the judge found the city in contempt and
fined it $100 a day, doubling the amount for each day of noncom-
pliance. 15 In a controversial move, the judge also found four coun-
cilmen in contempt for failing to vote for the legislation promised
by the consent decree and fined each of them $500 for every day
the legislation remained unadopted.'8 Beginning on August 11, the
court would then imprison the dissident councilmen until they
voted for the legislation or the legislation was passed.1 Though not
parties to the original suit, the councilmen found themselves in the
predicament of either voting in the manner ordered by the court or
going to prison. They continued to vote against the resolution, and
the court found the city and the four councilmen in contempt. 8
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court's con-
tempt sanctions against the councilmen but modified the sanctions
against the city.'9 The court declined to rule on the question of
legislative immunity, holding that the consent judgment commit-
ted the council to enact the legislation.20 Concerning the appeal of
a councilman who had never voted to accept any of the court's or-
ders, including the consent judgment, the court held that he too
was committed by the consent judgment.2 ' The court emphatically
stated, "Whatever the scope of local legislators' immunity, it does
not insulate them from compliance with a consent judgment to
which their city has agreed and which has been approved by their
legislative body. ' 22 On September 1, 1988, the Supreme Court,
over vigorous dissent by Justices Marshall and Brennan, granted a
23 Id.
1, Id at 450.
16 Id at 450-451.
16 Id at 451-452. One councilman was not immediately fined. He was allowed to find
counsel and appear before the court on August 4, when he was also found in contempt. This
finding was made "retroactive to August 2." Id at 452.
17 Id at 452.
18 Id at 451-452.
19 The Second Circuit limited the fine against the city to $1 million a day. Id at 460.
20 Id at 457.
22 Id.
22 Id.
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stay of the sanctions against the councilmen pending the filing of
the petitions for writs of certiorari.23 The coercive fines against the
city continued to run, and on September 1, 1988, the Yonkers City
Council finally agreed to enact the requisite legislation.24
The decision by Judge Sand to penalize the individual council-
men for contempt is the most troublesome aspect of the Yonkers
case. Indeed, his action is comparable to the actions of the judges
in the early English cases, which resulted in the creation of the
right of free speech and debate in Parliament.25 The English exec-
utive and judicial actions that brought the members of Parliament
into court and the federal judge's use of contempt in Yonkers both
interfered with the free legislative process that ultimately is the
right of the people and one of the foundations of republican
government.
The American form of republican government has as its foun-
dation popular sovereignty. 26 The people speak through their cho-
sen representatives. This infusion of the people's will into govern-
ment can be true to its source only if the spokespersons of the
people are unhindered in their speech, debate, and lawmaking. The
sole purpose of legislative immunity is to protect this mechanism.
If a legislator is deterred from faithful representation by other
forces in government, the foundation of popular sovereignty and
the legitimacy of the government are imperiled. The core value of
legislative freedom, therefore, is the ability of representatives to
voice the people's thoughts and consciences without any restric-
tion. When the people of a national or local government choose a
republican form of government, they expect that this core value
will not be taken away from them without their consent. Con-
versely, a legislator who takes on the heavy burden of speaking and
voting for the people-sometimes in the face of substantial pres-
sure-must expect that the people will protect him or her from
personal liability. Legislative immunity provides this protection.
This comment argues that a federal judge cannot use a con-
sent decree to force a municipal legislator to vote in a prescribed
way. The comment first reviews the history of legislative immunity
in England and the United States and argues that the majority of
23 Spallone v United States, 109 S Ct 14 (1988), cert granted, 109 S Ct 1337 (1989).
" McFadden, NY Times 36 (Sept 11, 1988) (cited in note 6).
25 Discussed in text at notes 30-50.
26 For a good summary of this concept of republican government and the Framers' in-
tent, see Comment, The Guarantee of Republican Government: Proposals for Judicial Re-
view, 54 U Chi L Rev 208, 227-30 (1987).
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federal appeals courts is correct in extending the privilege to mu-
nicipal legislators. This historical examination suggests that the
privilege is public in nature, and necessary to the structure of rep-
resentative government. Second, the comment explores whether in-
dividual legislators or the legislature as a whole may waive the
privilege. After determining that the public nature of the right pre-
cludes such waiver, the comment concludes that a consent decree
can have no effect upon the immunity.
I. HISTORY OF LEGISLATIVE IMMUNITY IN ENGLAND
Article 9 of the English Bill of Rights guarantees free "speech
or debate," 27 a privilege proclaimed at the opening of each Parlia-
ment as an "ancient and undoubted right."2 8 This right manifests
Parliament's independence from the Crown and judiciary, an inde-
pendence secured after centuries of struggle. From its origins, leg-
islative immunity was intended mainly as a protection of legisla-
tive independence, rather than a personal right protecting
individual legislators from penalties.29 A brief survey of the history
of the struggle for legislative independence will reveal the nature
of the right and the way in which it protects such independence.
One of the earliest assertions of legislative immunity was made
in the early sixteenth century by Richard Strode, a Member of the
House of Commons, who was convicted and imprisoned for propos-
ing legislation in Parliament.0 Strode appealed to the Parliament,
which abruptly overturned his conviction and resolved in an act
that its members had an absolute privilege "for any bill, speaking,
reasoning, or declaring of any matter or matters concerning the
Parliament." 1 Although this act was designed to secure perma-
nently Parliament's freedom from judicial intervention, such was
not the result.
Well into the seventeenth century, -the degree of parliamen-
tary independence from executive and judicial coercion remained
"7 1 William and Mary sess 2, c 2 (1689). See also Lois G. Schwoerer, The Declaration
of Rights, 1689 at 81-87 (Johns Hopkins, 1981).
" This right of free speech and debate, though renowned as "ancient and undoubted,"
first appeared during the reign of Henry VIII. Schwoerer, The Declaration of Rights, 1689
at 81-82 (cited in note 27). See also William S. Holdsworth, 6 A History Of English Law at
97-99 (Little, Brown, 1924).
" Brewster, 408 US at 507.
30 Barnett Cocks, ed, Erskine May's Treatise on The Law, Privileges Proceedings and
Usage of Parliament at 49-50 (Butterworth, 17th ed 1964); 4 Henry 8 c 8 (1512).
3' Cocks, ed, The Law, Privileges, Proceedings at 49-50.
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unsettled. 2 Sir John Eliot, a leading figure in seventeenth-century
English politics, battled for legislative independence, 3 only to be
convicted and imprisoned for his trouble in 1629. Eliot had fought
for the adoption of the Petition of Right in 1628 and in his final
speech in the House of Commons had protested the imposition of
"tonnage and poundage without grant of Parliament.314  The
Crown charged that the speech was "malicious," "seditious," and
"of dangerous consequence." He was further accused of conspiring
to confine the speaker of the House to his chair by force.3 5 The
speaker had been ordered by the King to close the session, but
Eliot and the other members not only refused the order to pro-
rogue the Parliament, they compelled the speaker to allow Eliot to
speak." Nine were arrested of which six "eventually made their
submission" and were released. 7 The remaining three including
Eliot were tried in the Court of King's Bench and all pleaded that
"these offenses are supposed to be done in parliament, and ought
not to be punished in this court, or in any other, but in parlia-
ment."38 The court convicted them, holding that the Act in
Strode's Case applied only to Strode and was not general law.3
The unfortunate Eliot died in prison in 1632,40 a martyr for the
cause of parliamentary independence.41
The cases against Strode and Eliot demonstrate that the
evolution of legislative immunity resulted from Parliament's desire
32 See Sir Walter Raleigh, The Prerogative of Parliaments in England. Proved in a
Dialogue (pro & contra) Between a Councellour of State and a Justice of the Peace (Mid-
delburg, 1628). See also Christopher Hill, Intellectual Origins of the English Revolution at
204 (Oxford, 1965).
33 See generally Harold Hulme, The Life of Sir John Eliot 1592 to 1632: Struggle for
Parliamentary Freedom (George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1957). Eliot was greatly influenced by
Raleigh's execution and led the fight for the reversal of Raleigh's attainder. John Forster, 1
Sir John Eliot: a Biography 1592-1632 at 19-20 (Chapman and Hall, 2d ed 1872); Hill,
Intellectual Origins at 208-09 (cited in note 32). Eliot began to use the words of Raleigh's
The Prerogative of Parliaments as a source for his crusade for parliamentary independence
in 1626. Id.
Hulme, The Life of Sir John Eliot at 226-64, 312.
3' Proceedings against Sir John Elliot, 3 Howell's St Trials at 293-294 (KB 1629).
31 Id at 294. Hulme, The Life of Sir John Eliot at 308 (cited in note 33).
17 Holdsworth, 6 A History Of English Law at 98 (cited in note 28).
" 3 Howell's St Trials at 294. For a description of the proceedings and the fates of the
other eight members, see Hulme, The Life of Sir John Eliot at 316-38 (cited in note 33).
, 3 Howell's St Trials at 294, 309-310.
Holdsworth, 6 A History Of English Law at 98 (cited in note 28).
41 "Sir John Eliot's fame ... rests on his defense of the liberties of the House of Com-
mons, on his defense of freedom of speech for which he sacrificed his life." Hulme, The Life
of Sir John Eliot at 390 (cited in note 33). "[T]he spirit of political liberty brought to life by
the Petition of Right was immeasurably strengthened by the martyrdom of Eliot." Id at 391.
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to protect its independent legislative role. 42 Whereas Eliot fash-
ioned his plea around the assertion that the King's Bench had no
jurisdiction over him,43 his ultimate objective was to defend the
independence of the House of Commons. Eliot reveals the reason
for his tenacious defense of the privilege of parliament in his alle-
gorical Apologie for Socrates: "it was for fear of the public privi-
lege and prejudice, not in jealousy of himself, that [he] exposed his
fortune and his person to preserve the right of the Senate."'44 That
he refused a trial and elected to languish in prison illustrates El-
iot's stalwart belief in legislative immunity as a public right. Eliot's
co-defendants, who were fined for conspiracy and sedition, also
placed themselves in considerable jeopardy to protect the privilege
of Parliament.45
Subsequent resolutions in Parliament leading to the creation
of the speech or debate privilege realized Eliot's objective.46 Only
nine years after his death, Parliament resolved that the charges
against Eliot and the others "for matters done in parliament,
[were] a breach of the privilege of parliament. '47 In 1667, the
House of Commons resolved that the Act in Strode's Case was
general law and protected all members of Parliament "for and
touching any bills, speaking, reasoning, or declaring of any .. .
matters, in and concerning the parliament."4 The House further
said that the privilege was both an "ancient and necessary" right.4"
42 United States v Brewster, 408 US 501, 507-508 (1972), citing United States v John-
son, 383 US 169, 178 (1966), and comparing the English to the American privilege.
4 3 Howell's St Trials 293, 293-294. The use of the jurisdictional plea to assert privilege
simply may have had a firmer legal basis before the English Bill of Rights. Eliot's assertion
of privilege overshadows any argument based on the relationship between courts. Later in
the seventeenth century, when a member of the House of Commons was being charged in
the House of Lords, the call for privilege was as strongly heard as it was when a court
happened to be subordinate to the House; see 3 Grey 140-47 regarding Shirley v Fagg, 6
Howell's St Trials 1121 (House of Lords 1675). See also Stockdale v Hansard, 112 Eng Rpt
1112, 1154-55 (QB 1839).
41 Sir John Eliot, Apologie for Socrates 15, reprinted in 3 Old South Leaflets No 59
(Directors of the Old South Work, 1896) (emphasis added).
" Holdsworth, 6 A History Of English Law at 97-98 (cited in note 28).
46 For an appendix detailing these various resolutions, see 3 Howell's St Trials at 312-
319.
" 3 Howell's St Trials at 312, 315. Holdsworth justifies the actions of the judges in
Eliot's Case by pointing out that the charges of seditious speech were "mixed up with the
charge of causing a riot in the House, which was not" privileged. Holdsworth, 6 A History of
English Law at 269 & n 4 (cited in note 28).
41 3 Howell's St Trials at 314-315, "Upon a Report made by Mr. Vaughan from the
committee concerning Freedom of Speech in parliament." See also Tenney v Brandhove,
341 US 367, 372 (1951).
19 3 Howell's St Trials at 315.
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Finally, more than fifty years after Eliot's death, the 1689 Bill of
Rights declared explicitly "[tihat the Freedom of Speech, and De-
bates or Proceedings in Parliament, ought not to be impeached or
questioned in any Court or Place out of Parliament."5
The Framers of the U.S. Constitution were well acquainted
with the injustice of these seventeenth-century English trials5 and
with the struggle for parliamentary independence.52 The privilege
of "[f]reedom of speech and action in the legislature was taken as a
matter of course by those who severed the Colonies from the
Crown and founded our Nation." 53 When they wrote a constitution
for their new government, they included the legislative right of
speech or debate.
II. SPEECH OR DEBATE AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of
the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance
at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and
returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in ei-
ther House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place. 4
The privilege of legislative immunity is deeply embedded in
our political system. The Articles of Confederation recognized the
privilege of free speech or debate in the Congress as an essential
right.5 The Framers of the Constitution clearly thought that such
freedom was important to the structure of government: they placed
the Speech or Debate Clause in the body of the Constitution, and,
in contrast to their handling of most other "matters of impor-
tance," they "accepted [the clause] with unanimous consent and
without discussion."56
50 1 William and Mary sess 2, c 2, art 9; See also Tenney, 341 US at 372. For a sum-
mary of the effects of Eliot's pursuit of legislative freedom on English History, see Hulme,
The Life of Sir John Eliot at 390-394 (cited in note 33).
1 The Framers had access to Howell's State Trials and seemed to be well acquainted
with its contents. See Peter Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 Mich L Rev 71, 94
(1974).
5" Tenney, 341 US at 372-373.
13 Id at 372. See also Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Ori-
gins of the Constitution at 46 (U Kan, 1985), stating that the "same right was claimed by
the American colonial legislatures throughout the eighteenth century."
11 US Const, Art I, § 6, cl 1.
15 Arts of Confed, Art V. Justice Frankfurter commented on the similarity between the
English Bill of Rights Article 9 and the Articles of Confederation Article V in Tenney, 341
US at 372.
"' David K. Watson, 1 The Constitution of the United States: Its History, Application
and Construction at 326 (Callaghan, 1910). See Max Farrand, ed, 2 The Records of the
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The right of legislative immunity appears not only in the U.S.
Constitution, but also in the constitutions of most states.57 The
state constitutions of Vermont and Massachusetts contain typical
clauses: "The freedom of deliberation, speech and debate in the
legislature, is so essential to the rights of the people, that it cannot
be the foundation of any accusation or prosecution, action or com-
plaint, in any other court or place whatsoever. ' 58 It is widely ac-
cepted in the common law moreover that legislators are not liable
for their legislative acts.5 9
Such universal acknowledgement of the privilege reflects a
century-old common law tradition in this country. The Framers
merely gave it a permanent place in the structure of the new gov-
ernment. This universal acceptance of the privilege was closely tied
to a commitment to the separation of powers. The necessity of sep-
aration of powers in a free society was most strongly advocated by
Montesquieu, who was, of course, a major influence on many of the
Framers.6" Montesquieu thought that a confusion of powers could
lead to "arbitrary control" or "oppression."'" If the "judiciary
power be not separated from the legislative and executive," "there
is no liberty. '"6 2 Montesquieu's concept was certainly not new;
many English writers had also developed ideas of separate
powers.63
The principle of speech and debate is an integral part of such
Federal Convention of 1787 at 254 (Yale, 2d ed 1937). See also United States v Johnson,
383 US 169, 177-178 (1966).
" Forty-three state constitutions contain the speech or debate privilege; five state con-
stitutions have a more restricted form of immunity; "[o]nly Florida and North Carolina do
not have some form of constitutional protection for legislators." Developments in the Law-
Privileged Communications, 98 Harv L Rev 1450, 1615 n 129 (1985) (citations omitted).
58 Vt Const, ch 1, sec XVI (1786) (superseded 1793); Mass Declaration of Rights, Art
XXI (1780) (emphasis added).
"' See Tenney v Brandhove, 341 US 367, 373-376 (1951). See also Eugene McQuillin, 4
The Law of Municipal Corporations §12.222 at 238-240 .(Callaghan, 3d ed 1985), for a sum-
mary of state application of the immunity to local legislators. The treatise states that legis-
lative immunity is "so elementary, so fundamentally sound, and has been so universally
accepted, that but few cases can be found where the doctrine has been questioned and judi-
cially declared." Id at 238-239.
60 See, for example, Federalist 9 (Hamilton) in The Federalist at 124, 126-29, and Fed-
eralist 47 (Madison) in The Federalist at 336, 338 (cited in note 2).
61 Baron de Montesquieu, 1 The Spirit of the Laws at 182 (Appleton, Thomas Nugent,
trans, 1900).
62 Id.
43 Clement Walker, Relations and Observations, Historicall and Politick Upon the
Parliament Begun Anno Dom. 1640 (1648); Marchamont Nedham, The Excellencie of a
Free State (1656); John Locke, Second Treatise §§ 143, 144, 150, 159 (1689); all reprinted in
Philip B. Kurland and Ralph Lerner, eds, 1 The Founders' Constitution: Major Themes at
314-316 (Chicago, 1987).
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separation. 4 By cloaking legislators in this privilege, the Framers
assured that the people's representatives would be insulated from
the coercion of other branches. Thomas Jefferson ably explained
the goals served by such insulation:
[T]hat in order to give to the will of the people the influence
it ought to have, and the information which may enable them
to exercise it usefully, it was a part of the common law,
adopted as the law of this land, that their representatives, in
the discharge of their functions, should be free from the cog-
nizance or coercion of the coordinate branches, Judiciary and
Executive. 5
Two different but complementary goals are evident from Jeffer-
son's statement. First, the people must be free to control their rep-
resentatives and their deliberations. Jefferson's notion that elected
representatives "ought" to exert the "will of the people" is inexora-
bly linked to the proposition that the speech and debate of legisla-
tors must be free of "coercion." Other branches of government can-
not intrude on a legislator's freedom to vote without injuring the
source of the representative's voice-the people.
Second, the people must have the necessary information to
control the legislative process. If other branches may coerce the
legislative branch, the people will be thwarted in their attempts to
fix accountability on their rulers. The Framers' attitude towards
accountability and its relation to the separation of powers can be
seen in the struggle over the appointment and removal powers. In
1789, James Madison urged the Congress to limit the power to re-
move executive officers to the President. Arguing that any further
confusion of the executive and the legislative branches would
"abolish at once that great principle of unity and responsibility of
the [E]xecutive department," 6 he further stated, "I believe no
1, See Johnson, 383 US at 178-179, in which the Court states that, "In the American
governmental structure the clause serves the additional function of reinforcing the separa-
tion of powers so deliberately established by the Founders." Referring to Federalist 48
(Madison), the Court further states, "The legislative privilege, protecting against possible
'prosecution by an unfriendly executive and conviction by a hostile judiciary, is one manifes-
tation of the 'practical security' for ensuring the independence of the legislature." See also
Coffin v Coffin, 4 Mass 1, 27 (1808); Federalist 66 (Hamilton) in The Federalist at 431, 435
(cited in note 2), "The truth is, that [even in cases of possibly harmful legislation] ... it is
essential to the freedom and to the necessary independence of the deliberations of the body,
that the members of it should be exempt from punishment for acts done in a collective
capacity .... "
5 United States v Brewster, 408 US 501, 548-549 (1972) (Brennan, dissenting and cit-
ing Paul Ford, ed, 8 The Works of Thomas Jefferson at 322 (Putnam, 1904)).
66 1 Annals of Cong 518. See also Bowsher v Synar, 478 US 714, 723 (1986) (discussing
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principle is more clearly laid down in the [C]onstitution than that
of responsibility. '6 7
Alexander Hamilton had earlier used the same argument to
justify the appointment process. He stated: "The blame of a bad
nomination would fall upon the President singly and absolutely.
The censure of rejecting a good one would lie entirely at the door
of the Senate . "... ,e The separation of powers, therefore, "se-
cure[s] the accountability of the individuals in the great depart-
ments of the government.""9 Legislative immunity from coercion
by other branches is an important component of this doctrine: it
both allows the voice of the people to be heard, and it helps ensure
actual separation.
The denial of legislative immunity could destroy accountabil-
ity by allowing courts to interfere with legislation before it is en-
acted. Judicial review of a law after it is passed, on the other hand,
protects both separation and the underlying value that legislative
immunity is meant to protect-free deliberation and accountabil-
ity. When the judiciary declares a law invalid, it fixes accountabil-
ity on the judge for his or her review and on the legislature for its
mistake. The people then have no doubt who is responsible. If leg-
islators are not immune, however, they can be coerced to legislate
in a manner that may be at odds with the will of the people. When
this happens the people not only lose their representation in the
legislative process, but also are less clearly able to fix accountabil-
ity on the de facto legislator, who may well be a judge acting
through a consent decree. A judge's encroachment into legislative
affairs is thus undesirable, since it precludes the "full, vigorous,
and open debate" that the separation of powers doctrine "deliber-
ately" preserves.70
Although state or local legislative immunity does not support
the separation of powers in the federal government, it protects the
same values of free deliberation and accountability. Moreover, it
helps to preserve a state or local version of the separation of pow-
ers. On the federal level, the Speech and Debate Clause protects
popular sovereignty from judicial and executive attacks by ensur-
the debate over the removal power).
' 1 Annals of Cong at 480.
48 Federalist 77 (Hamilton) in The Federalist at 484, 486 (cited in note 2). For a discus-
sion of responsibility and appointments at the Constitutional Convention, see Farrand, 2
Records at 41-43, 80 (cited in note 56).
"' Nathaniel Chipman, Sketches of the Principles of Government 120-127 (1793), re-
printed in Kurland and Lerner, eds, 1 The Founders' Constitution at 333 (cited in note 63).
" Bowsher, 478 US at 722.
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ing that representatives execute their offices without impediment.
Legislative immunity at the state and local level works in a similar
way by protecting state and local legislators from coercion by the
federal government and from coercion by competing branches at
the local level. On the federal level, the Speech and Debate Clause
allows the people to fix responsibility upon the legislature for legis-
lative acts. Congressmen and Senators cannot place the blame for
their actions on others; they have full independence to vote as they
please. In the same way, legislative immunity ensures accountabil-
ity at the local level. State and local legislators may not blame the
courts or Congress for their actions.
III. LEGISLATIVE IMMUNITY UNDER THE FEDERAL COMMON LAW
This comment has thus far detailed how the policies and his-
tory underlying the federal guarantee of legislative immunity apply
to legislative immunity at the local level. Yet, the Speech and De-
bate Clause of the federal Constitution does not apply to state and
local legislators. We must therefore turn to other sources in order
to find the legal basis of this immunity.
A. The Scope of Federal Common Law Immunity
The Supreme Court has found protection for legislative bodies
in federal common law. In Tenney v Brandhove, the Court com-
pared the Speech or Debate Clause, which protects members of
Congress, to the common law immunity of others who act in "the
sphere of legitimate legislative activity.""' Here the Court held
that individual members of the California legislature, who had
been sued by the plaintiff for a deprivation of his rights under fed-
eral law, possessed legislative immunity.72 The Court refused to de-
cide whether Congress had the power to abrogate that immunity.73
Instead, it held that, in passing 42 USC §§ 1983 and 1985 (then 8
USC §§ 43 and 47), Congress did not intend to abrogate that im-
munity.74 Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority, explained
that the roots of both the common law immunity and the constitu-
tional privilege stem from the same historical foundation in the
71 341 US at 376.
72 Id at 371, 379.
73 Justice Frankfurter seemed to doubt that Congress could abrogate such immunity
"Let us assume, merely for the moment, that Congress has constitutional power to limit the
freedom of State legislators within their traditional sphere. That would be a big assump-
tion." Tenney, 341 US at 376.
74 Id.
1132 [56:1121
Consent Decrees and Legislative Immunity
"Parliamentary struggles of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centu-
ries. '75 He cited the English Bill of Rights as the last step in the
establishment of the immunity that had been denied Sir John
Eliot.78
In Lake Country Estates, Inc. v Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 7 the Supreme Court extended immunity beyond the state
level to regional legislative bodies. Lake Country Estates involved
a commission created by California and Nevada to oversee coordi-
nate development in the Lake Tahoe area. In his dissent from the
Court's opinion, Justice Marshall stated, "the majority's reasoning
in this case leaves little room to argue that municipal legislators
stand on a different footing than their regional counterparts." He
argued that the majority's rule "applies with equal force whether
the officials occupy local or regional positions. '78 Following the
Court's reasoning in this case, seven circuits have held that legisla-
tive immunity applies at the municipal level.7" The Eighth Circuit
noted that there was not "a material distinction between the need
for insulating legislative decision-making at the state or regional
level and a corresponding need at the municipal level."80 The same
importance that state legislators have and that the Congress has
under the Constitution gives local legislators protection under the
common law.
B. Immunity for Harmful Legislative Acts
Legislative immunity under federal common law is absolute in
character and broad in scope. It applies even when legislators vio-
late the Constitution or commit a tort in the course of passing
laws. In Tenney v Brandhove, Justice Frankfurter reviewed the
long history of legislative immunity and concluded that the privi-
lege can be claimed even when it is used for an "unworthy pur-
pose.""" His broad definition of immunity stems from its nature as
78 Tenney, 341 US at 372.
76 Id.
77 440 US 391, 405-406 (1979).
78 Id at 407-408.
79 See Yonkers, 856 F2d at 456, for a list of these cases.
SO Gorman Towers, Inc. v Bogoslavsky, 626 F2d 607, 612 (8th Cir 1980). See Domestic
Linen Supply & Laundry Co. v Stone, 111 Mich App 827, 314 NW2d 773, 777 (Mich App
1982) (holding that a mayor and purchasing director were absolutely immune for statements
made during a city council meeting). Michigan's common law protected municipal legisla-
tors's speech as early as 1893. Id. See also Timber Properties, Inc. v Chester Tp., 205 NJ
Super 273, 500 A2d 757, 763, 765-766 (NJ Super 1984) (holding that municipal officers have
absolute immunity for legislative acts under both federal and state common law).
81 341 US 367, 377 (1951).
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a protection of the "public good," not as a "private indulgence."8' 2
In cases in which private parties are harmed by legislative acts, the
dispositive issue on liability is whether the defendant committed
the offense while "acting as a representative." 3 Courts have found
legislative immunity not only in cases where legislative acts inci-
dentally harmed private parties (for example, through zoning
changess4) but also in cases of more egregious conduct, such as vot-
ing to violate the civil rights of property owners, 5 to drive a person
out of business,"6 to wrongfully discharge an employee,8 7 or to pre-
vent a developer, for racially discriminatory reasons, from building
housing for elderly and handicapped persons. 8
Such broad immunity might seem to work harshly against in-
jured plaintiffs, but there are alternative remedies. The Supreme
Court has noted that plaintiffs in such cases still have recourse
against the city. In Owen v City of Independence, the Court ex-
plained that when Congress enacted 42 USC § 1983 it allowed suits
against cities, and yet retained the common law immunities for in-
dividual officers of government.8 9 Since the plaintiff's rights could
be "vindicat[ed]" in this way, the Court "concluded that overrid-
ing considerations of public policy" required that certain govern-
ment officials be immune from suit.90
These "overriding considerations," which protect the "public
good," are "equally applicable to federal, state, and regional legis-
lators"91 and ought to apply to the protection of municipal legisla-
tors as well. A plaintiff may obtain a judgment against a city, while
at the same time the immunity of individual legislators protects
the interests of the people.9 2
82 Id.
83 Coffin, 4 Mass at 29. In Kilbourn v Thompson, 103 US 168, 204-205 (1880), Justice
Miller postulated that there might be some acts, such as executing a "Chief Magistrate of
the nation" or "assuming the function of a court for capital punishment" that would be
"such an utter perversion of their powers to a criminal purpose" that they should not be
protected.
6' Hernandez v City of Lafayette, 643 F2d 1188, 1194 (5th Cir 1981) (mayor has abso-
lute immunity from suit for vetoing a zoning ordinance); Kuzinich v County of Santa Clara,
689 F2d 1345, 1349 (9th Cir 1982) (local legislators immune for general zoning ordinance).
85 Reed v Village of Shorewood, 704 F2d 943, 952-953 (7th Cir 1983). The municipality,
however, was held liable under § 1983.
88 Espanola Way Corp. v Meyerson, 690 F2d 827 (11th Cir 1982).
87 Aitchison v Raffiani, 708 F2d 96 (3d Cir 1983).
11 Gorman Towers, 626 F2d at 610.
89 Owen v City of Independence, 445 US 622, 653 n 37 (1980).
80 Id at 653 & n 37.
91 Lake Country Estates, 440 US at 405.
82 Gorman Towers, 626 F2d at 612-13. The legislative history of § 1983 supports the
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It might seem unjust that retention of the privilege might al-
low "reckless men to slander and even destroy others."93 A person
whose constitutional rights are infringed by the legislative acts of a
city council may have a remedy against the city, but the remedy
might not be fully adequate in every case. Nonetheless, "[t]he in-
jury to the reputation of a private citizen is of less importance...
than the free and unreserved exercise of the duties of a representa-
tive, unawed by the fear of legal prosecutions." 4 Sometimes in a
free society the "private benefit must submit to the public good."9 5
The distinction between individual immunity and immunity
for the municipality as a whole may seem illusory. Why should it
matter whether a court enforces a consent decree against an indi-
vidual legislator or against a governmental body? In both cases leg-
islation may inevitably be passed, and in both cases the legislator
may be pressured to enact specific legislation. The distinction is
clear, however, when the force is exerted directly on the body and
not on the legislator. In this instance, the representative still has
some room to deliberate and hence may decide one way or another.
This individual freedom to speak, debate, and choose is the core
value that the immunity is meant to preserve. As the people's rep-
resentative, he or she may even choose a course that causes the
people to suffer, but the legislator remains accountable to the peo-
ple. Further, holding the city but not individual legislators liable
places the burden of correcting the conduct on the people, who are
responsible for the acts of their representatives. Thus, some courts
have enforced judgments that pressure the people to cause legisla-
tion to occur, and yet these decisions do not hold individual legis-
lators liable and therefore do not cross the barrier of legislative
immunity.98
intention of Congress to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity in order to allow suits
against a state or municipality. Owen, 445 US at 638. Nevertheless, there is no evidence that
Congress intended to abrogate absolute legislative immunity. Consumers Union, 446 US at
732-33. "[D]ifferent considerations" require that immunity be maintained for individual leg-
islators. Id at 653 n 37.
" Brewster, 408 US at 516.
Coffin, 4 Mass at 28.
95 Id.
96 United States v City of Parma, Ohio, 661 F2d 562, 577 (6th Cir 1981) (required the
city to "adopt a plan to utilize an existing" federal program). Arthur v Nyquist, 547 F Supp
468, 484 (W D NY 1982) (court directed "the Mayor and the Common Council to make
available to the board an additional $7,400,000"), aff'd 712 F2d 809 (2d Cir 1983).
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C. Damages and Prospective Relief
The discussion thus far has focused upon retroactive damage
relief, relief for acts done in the past. Unlike the typical cases for
damages against legislators, the Yonkers case resulted in prospec-
tive relief.97 Immunity might be applied differently to prospective
relief than to damages liability if the immunity were merely an in-
dividual right. The Second Circuit may have subscribed to this in-
terpretation when it stated that the Yonkers councilmen could
avoid personal jeopardy simply by resigning. 8 Prospective relief,
therefore, does not pose as great a danger to the legislator, since he
or she can step aside or comply and not face a penalty. Neverthe-
less, since legislative immunity has the main purpose to protect
deliberation and choice in legislative activity-not the individ-
ual-the type of relief sought against a legislator is unimportant. If
the immunity was meant to protect a councilman as an individual
only, resignation might be a satisfactory choice. In seventeenth-
century England, for example, Eliot might have chosen to obey the
king's command to prorogue the session. Indeed, had Eliot not de-
livered his speech in defiance of the order, he would have avoided
imprisonment. Similarly, the state supreme court justices in Su-
preme Court of Virginia v Consumers Union might have resigned
to avoid the declaratory action brought against them under § 1983.
And yet, the U.S. Supreme Court held that in their legislative role
(as promulgators of the bar code) the justices were immune from
the award of attorney's fees that would have accompanied any pro-
spective relief.9 The "public privilege"100 of a free legislative pro-
cess, not the individual's protection from suit, is the core value of
the immunity. It should apply to any person performing the legis-
lative function regardless of the form of relief sought.
D. Legislative and Executive Acts
Legislative immunity is based not on a legislator's title, but on
the nature of his or her action.10 1 It is necessary, therefore, to dif-
" The Supreme Court has held that those performing legislative acts at the state level
are immune from both retroaqtive and prospective relief. Supreme Court of Virginia v Con-
sumers Union, 446 US 719, 732-733 (1980) (holding that the justices of the state supreme
court were immune from liability for attorney's fees and prospective relief for the legislative
act of promulgating the state bar code).
" United States v City of Yonkers, 856 F2d 444, 457 (2d Cir 1988).
446 US at 738.
'*o Eliot, Apologie for Socrates at 15 (cited in note 44).
101 Consumers Union, 446 US at 734.
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ferentiate carefully between legislative and executive acts,1"2 since
in certain cases, a municipal legislator can perform an executive
act that does not fall within absolute protection. A local legislator
has absolute immunity for "every thing said or done by him, as a
representative, in the exercise of the functions of that office."103
The "formulation of policy"104 and the "drafting" of ordinances 0 5
are legislative. In short, legislative immunity protects legislators
for acts that are "clearly a part of the legislative process."'0 6 Exec-
utive acts, on the other hand, have only qualified immunity.0 7 The
representative character of legislating distinguishes the two and re-
quires greater protection for legislative acts. Limitation of the im-
munity for executive acts is required because the beneficial check
of judicial review would be ineffective if an official could not be
prevented from or punished for executing judicially invalidated
laws.
A definitional problem arises when executive and legislative
powers are combined in the same body. Justice Marshall hesitated
to grant certiorari in Yonkers because of the dual nature of the
Yonkers city council, which exercised both "executive and legisla-
tive powers.' 0 8 Of course, not even the federal system has com-
plete separation of powers. 09 When the Court has encountered the
mixed nature of some state offices in the past, it has consistently
characterized the act of legislating as pertaining only to the nature
of the activity and not to the title of the person performing the
function. 10 Indeed, both the Yonkers city council and Judge Sand
seemed aware of this, and each wanted the other to carry out the
essentially legislative function of approving the policy of the hous-
101 Compare Aitchison v Raffiani, 708 F2d 96, 99 (3d Cir 1983) (mayor immune for
voting to abolish a person's government job; borough attorney immune for drafting the leg-
islation), with Gross v Winter, 692 F Supp 1420, 1424-1425 (D DC 1988) (councilwoman not
immune for discharging an employee, because the action was not done by the council as a
part of "enacting legislation."). See also Cinevision Corp. v City of Burbank, 745 F2d 560,
580 (9th Cir 1984) (holding that voting on proposed concerts is an executive function, since
it was merely "monitoring and administering the contract" and was "more the type of ad
hoc decisionmaking engaged in by an executive.").
1os Coffin, 4 Mass at 27.
104 Cinevision, 745 F2d at 580; Breck v Ulmer, 745 P2d 66, 71 (Alaska 1987).
100 Aitchison, 708 F2d at 99.
100 Brewster, 408 US at 516. In § 1983 actions, the Court "generally ha[s] equated" the
legislative immunity of the Speech or Debate Clause to the privilege in the common law.
Consumers Union, 446 US at 733.
107 Scheuer v Rhodes, 416 US 232, 243-248 (1974).
sn Spallone v United States, 109 S Ct 14, 19 (1988).
100 Mistretta v U.S., 109 S Ct 647, 659 (1989).
11 Consumers Union, 446 US at 734.
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ing plan.1 ' Judges usually try to leave this lawmaking to the legis-
lators in order to avoid constitutional and public accountability
problems. Consent decrees, since they emanate from an agreement
by the parties, can relieve a judge of the task of forcing action. If
the decree contains an agreement to legislate and the legislators
fail to comply, however, the judge may interfere with the legisla-
tive process by ordering compliance.
Since the nation's founding, legislative freedom has been pro-
tected by the U.S. Constitution, the various state constitutions,
and the common law. This freedom is traceable to the founding
itself and, before that, to the English people's assertion of their
sovereignty in government in the seventeenth century. The Speech
or Debate Clause protects this freedom in Congress, the state con-
stitutions secure it in state government, and the common law
guards it at all other levels. When a court suppresses the freedom
of speech or debate of local legislators, the federal common law
may be the last line of defense. This defense is warranted, since
the right of the people to representation extends through all levels
of the hierarchy of government-municipal, state, and federal. A
municipal legislator's voice may seem insignificant in the grand
scheme of lawmaking, but it is still the voice of the people. Legisla-
tive immunity ensures the unimpeded deliberation and lawmaking
functions of the people through their representatives and is an es-
sential ingredient in the republican form of government.
The histories of our political system and common law reveal
that the roots of legislative immunity are deep. The people possess
this freedom just as they possess the right to choose their govern-
ment. Those who are elected to represent the people likewise have
a vested right in the privilege; they should not be held liable for
representing their constituents' will.
IV. THE ABROGATION AND WAIVER OF LEGISLATIVE IMMUNITY
Thus far, this comment has argued that it is proper to extend
the absolute immunity traditionally accorded state legislators to
municipalities as well. As noted, seven courts of appeal have held
that immunity exists on the municipal level, although the Supreme
111 United States v City of Yonkers, 856 F2d 444, 450-451 (2d Cir 1988). The city had
even tried to avoid the responsibility of performing the legislative function by returning the
$30 million in federal funds. Id at 449.
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Court has not specifically addressed such legislative immunity.112
Nevertheless, the existence of such immunity does not end the
inquiry. The issue remains whether legislative immunity be waived
either by local legislative bodies, or by individual legislators. If ei-
ther sort of waiver is possible, then legislators may be bound to
vote in a certain way via consent decrees. The answer to this ques-
tion depends chiefly on whether the right of immunity is a private
right, or a public one. If the right is purely private, then each legis-
lator would have to waive the privilege individually in order to be
subject to sanctions. As the early English cases and the develop-
ment of the right in America suggest, legislative immunity has, as
its main purpose, the "preserv[ation of] legislative indepen-
dence," 1 and is a "public privilege."-1 4 The judiciary, therefore,
must protect this independence "without altering the historic bal-
ance of the three co-equal branches of Government."" 5 Any ques-
tion of waiver must focus on the nature of this right and the values
it is meant to protect. The following two sections examine whether
Congress has abrogated the immunity of local legislators and
whether or not such immunity is waivable.
A. Has Congress Abrogated the Immunity of Local Legislators?
In determining whether Congress abrogated immunity, both
its intent and its power to do so must be examined. Regarding in-
tent, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to find a waiver. In
Tenney, the Court found it inconceivable "that Congress-itself a
staunch advocate of legislative freedom-would impinge on a tra-
dition so well grounded in history and reason ..... ,6The Court
held that, in passing the "statute of 1871" (which later became 42
USC § 1983), Congress did not intend that the common law immu-
nity of legislators be abrogated. 1 7
Regardless of whether Congress has intended to abrogate im-
munity, it seems unlikely that Congress has the power to abrogate
legislative immunity for municipal councilmen." 8 Objections to
112 See text accompanying notes 77-80.
113 Brewster, 408 US at 508.
114 Eliot, Apologie for Socrates at 15 (cited in note 44).
115 Brewster, 408 US at 508.
Tenney, 341 US at 376.
17 Id at 379. See Consumers Union, 446 US at 732, 738, which held that "Congress did
not intend § 1983 to abrogate" the legislative immunity of state legislators or those acting in
the capacity as such for either damages or prospective relief (citing Tenney, 341 US 367
(1951)). See also note 92.
11 In Tenney, 341 US at 376, the Court cautioned that it would be a "big assumption"
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Congress's power can be made on two grounds: the First Amend-
ment freedom of speech, and the federal government's duty to
guarantee republican government to every state.
A few legislators have pleaded that Congress is restrained in
its power to abrogate legislative immunity at any level because the
"speech or debate" of legislators is protected as "free speech"
under the First Amendment. The Second Circuit rejected this
claim in Yonkers.""' However, other courts have accepted the ap-
plication of the First Amendment to a legislator's act of voting.120
This comparison of the legislative privilege of unhampered voting
to free speech may in fact be tenable, because originally "freedom
of speech" referred only to the legislative privilege.1 21 It seems
anomalous that the citizen's right to petition government and to
speak on political issues should stop at the council chamber door.
The analogy of voting to political speech does highlight the public
nature of legislative immunity and the core value that it reflects-a
representative form of government.
Abrogation of immunity may also interfere with the govern-
ment's duty to guarantee a "Republican Form of Government" to
every state.'22 The Constitution seems to restrict the federal gov-
ernment's power to take away legislative immunity from a
subordinate legislature.'2 3 By abrogating the immunity of legisla-
to think that Congress had the power to "limit the freedom of State legislators."
118 Yonkers, 856 F2d at 457.
120 See Wrzeski v City of Madison, 558 F Supp 664 (W D Wis 1983) (holding that the
First Amendment protected a city councilwoman from an ordinance imposing penalties on
her for refusing to vote). See also Clarke u United States, 705 F Supp 605 (D DC 1988)
(holding that a Congressional act violated the First Amendment because it compelled the
District's councilmen to vote for an amendment to a city act). The court held that the act of
voting was "core political speech." Id at 610, citing Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 1, 14 (1976).
But note that unlike Yonkers, the alleged coercion in Clarke did not affect any individual's
immunity; the act, which threatened a reduction in federal funds, was addressed to the city
as a whole.
.21 McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum at 46 (cited in note 53).
122 US Const, Art IV, § 4. Note that the Supreme Court has hesitated on questions
regarding the forms of state governments on the ground that such "political question[s]" are
"nonjusticiable." See Baker v Carr, 369 US 186, 224-29 (1962).
123 Madison defines a republic as "a government in which the scheme of representation
takes place" and through that representation the "public voice" may "be more consonant to
the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves .... ." Madison's understand-
ing of a republican form of government is not dependent on whether the government is at
the local or federal level. Federalist 10 (Madison) in The Federalist at 129, 133-35 (cited in
note 2). Hamilton declares that the Judiciary "can declare the acts of [the legislature] void."
The premise that the "interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the
courts" does not seem to require or indicate that the judiciary has the power to coerce
individual legislators to vote in a prescribed manner. Federalist 78 (Hamilton) in id at 489,
492.
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tors, Congress or the courts affect the form and operation of a leg-
islative body, and alter the independence of a subordinate branch
of state government. If a government's representative branch does
not have the freedom to vote in a representative manner, it is not a
republican form of government.
B. Can Either an Individual Legislator or a Legislative Body
Waive the Public Privilege?
The history of legislative immunity reveals that it is not merely a
private right, waivable by the individual. It is a public right, for
the benefit of the people as a whole. The Supreme Court has never
decided whether a legislative body or individual legislature may
waive the privilege. In United States v Helstoski,2 4 the Supreme
Court held that in the absence of a waiver, which is "at least as
clear and unambiguous" as a waiver of Fifth Amendment protec-
tion, evidence from a congressman's legislative actions could not be
used against him in a criminal prosecution.125 Although the Court
questioned whether any waiver is constitutional, it did not decide
the issue since there was no "explicit and unequivocal expression"
of a waiver in the case. 26 Since the question has been left open by
the courts, it is necessary to turn to history.
In his Manual Of Parliamentary Practice, Thomas Jefferson
describes legislative immunity as a privilege of the House as a
whole. A member who waives it individually can be punished for
such an attempt and in any case "cannot in effect waive the privi-
lege of the House. 11 2 7 Jefferson cites the case of Sir John Fagg, a
member of the House of Commons, who had waived the privilege
in a case appealed to the House of Lords. 28 Fagg was sent to the
Tower for his indiscretion 29 because the House believed that no
argument justified an individual's waiver of privilege. 30 Under Jef-
124 442 US 477 (1979).
11" Helstoski, 442 US at 492-93.
'It Id at 493. "We recognize that an argument can be made from precedent and history
that Congress, as a body, should not be free to strip individual Members of the protection
guaranteed by the Clause .... The controversy over the Alien and Sedition Acts reminds us
how one political party in control of both the Legislative and the Executive Branches sought
to use the courts to destroy political opponents." Id at 492-93.
227 Thomas Jefferson, A Manual Of Parliamentary Practice, for use of the Senate of
the United States, reprinted in Joel B. Sutherland, A Congressional Manual 103, 119 (Pe-
ter Hay, 1839).
128 Id, citing 3 Grey at 140, 222 (cited in note 1). See Shirley v Fagg, 6 Howell's St
Trials 1121 (House of Lords 1675).
121 3 Grey at 226 (cited in note 1).
130 Id at 140. The dispute over the privileges of the House of Commons temporarily
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ferson's view, a municipal legislator's waiver of his or her privilege,
is not a valid waiver because it is without authority.
Jefferson's statement should not be taken to mean that the
House as a whole can waive the privilege, for legislative immunity
is more than a mere privilege of the legislature. It is integral to the
structure of government and is designed for the benefit of the pub-
lic as a whole. This concept-that the purpose of the immunity is
to protect the public good-is a constant theme in cases involving
legislative immunity from seventeenth century England to present
day America. In the leading English case of Stockdale v Hansard,
Justice Coleridge, after deciding that a publisher could not gain
legislative privilege for a libellous work simply by allowing Parlia-
ment to publish it, stated: "The privileges of the House are my
own privileges, the privileges of every citizen in the land."' 31
The privilege has been regarded as a public right in America
as well. James Wilson, a Framer who championed the addition of
the Speech or Debate Clause to the Constitution, described the
purpose of the privilege:
In order to enable and encourage a representative of the pub-
lic to discharge his public trust with firmness and success, it is
indispensably necessary, that he should enjoy the fullest lib-
erty of speech, and that he should be protected from the re-
sentment of every one, however powerful, to whom the exer-
cise of that liberty may occasion offence. 32
In the early nineteenth century case of Coffin v Coffin,' 33 Chief
Justice Parsons of the Massachusetts Supreme Court described
legislative immunity as an individual privilege, a privilege of the
House, and a public right. Not only can an individual not waive it,
but since it is a legislator's privilege, the House as a whole cannot
waive it. 34 Ultimately, it is the people's right: the people grant this
privilege to their individual legislators not to protect the elected
officials, but to "support the rights of the people, by enabling their
representatives to execute the functions of their office without fear
of prosecutions, civil or criminal."' 3 5
This expression of the public nature of the legislative privilege
ended on November 22, 1675, when the Parliament was prorogued at the request of the
Lords. 6 Howell's St Trials 1186 (House of Lords 1675).
131 112 Eng Rpt 1112, 1203 (QB 1839).
i 2 Works of James Wilson at 38 (cited in note 3).
4 Mass 1, 27 (1808).
234 Id.
135 Id.
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suggests that because the right is the people's, only they can waive
it. Immunity for legislative acts is a necessary freedom that is
bound to the concept of genuine representation. It follows that the
source of this immunity is the people who have chosen to have rep-
resentative government. Only they can alter the nature of their
voice in government through the lawful process by which changes
in government are effected. At the federal level, change in the form
of representation can be made by amendment to the Constitution;
at the state level, each state likewise has a lawful mechanism for
changing the form of government. At the municipal level, state or
local charters may give the people a method of changing the form
of representation perhaps by referendum or through action by
their state representatives.' 36 In any case, lawful means to effect
change in government exist, and any diminution of the freedom of
representative government must be made by the people-not the
courts-through lawful means.
Legislative immunity is not only a right of the people, it be-
comes a right of each individual legislator when he or she takes on
the responsibility of representation. A legislator acts under the
presumption that he or she speaks for the people. The representa-
tive should be able to take for granted the immunity that the priv-
ilege is designed to protect. If the people lawfully alter the form of
representative government by diminishing or abrogating the im-
munity, the legislator loses not only the freedom to make law in an
unimpeded manner, he or she also loses an essential part of the
role of legislator. The legislator is then on notice that he or she is
in effect not free to legislate. On the other hand, when a legislator
acts under the lawful protection of the privilege (e.g., by voting or
debating), even the people cannot strip him or her of the lawful
immunity for actions already taken.
A court should not be able to take away the legislative privi-
lege without the authority of the people and a specific waiver by
every affected legislator. A court nevertheless retains the ability to
compel a city as a body to execute the law. Although a federal
judge may perform quasi-legislative or extra-judicial functions
when such powers have been specifically delegated, there are limits
to this power.137 Courts may not assume the legislative role. As in
Yonkers,'3 8 local legislators might well insist that a judge enact the
M3 Note that in Yonkers there was a state mechanism in place to remove power from
the council if it became necessary. Yonkers, 856 F2d at 458.
'" Mistretta v U.S., 109 S Ct 647, 658-67 (1989).
13 Yonkers, 856 F2d at 451.
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unpopular legislation, so that the blame will rest on the judge
rather than on the legislator. A judge can neatly sidestep this trap
by trying to coax the parties into an agreed upon compromise,
called a consent decree.
V. CONSENT DECREES
This comment has suggested that legislative immunity cannot
be waived except by the people through a fundamental restructur-
ing of the form of government. It is equally doubtful that an indi-
vidual legislator or a group of legislators can waive the immunity
through accession to a consent decree. The nature of consent de-
crees and their effect on the parties to agreements, as well as on
third parties, demonstrate that legislators at all levels who have
the common law privilege cannot be coerced by the enforcement of
a consent decree. The comment will analyze three facets of the
consent decree issue: the authority of legislators to enter into a de-
cree waiving immunity, the legality of such a waiver, and the effec-
tiveness of consent decrees in resolving disputes.
A consent decree is like a contract: the parties who give con-
sent must first have the authority to do so, and, second, they must
make a lawful agreement. In Local Number 93, International As-
sociation of Firefighters v City of Cleveland,"s9 the Supreme Court
upheld a consent decree even though its scope exceeded the rem-
edy that could have been awarded under statutory authority had
the case been tried."1 0 The Court stated that consent decrees have
a "dual character": they are both contracts and judgments."'
Whereas the decree has the force of a judgment, the authority of
the court to enforce the consent decree emanates from the contrac-
tual agreement of the parties. " " Justice Brennan explained that it
is "the agreement of the parties, rather than the force of law upon
which the complaint was originally based, that creates the obliga-
tions embodied in a consent decree,""" but that these obligations
may not conflict with or violate the law."' These two issues-the
authority of parties to enter into a contract and the lawfulness of
the decree-are central to understanding the municipal legislator's
--9 478 US 501 (1986).
10 Id at 528. The only question raised and addressed was whether the consent decree
was prohibited by the federal statute (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) upon which
the original suit was brought. Id at 514.
141 Id at 519.
142 Id at 522.
143 Id.
144 Id at 526.
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privileges in an agreement between a city and another party.
A. The Authority of the Parties to Enter into the Agreement
Consent decrees, like contracts, must be agreed upon by all
parties in order to bind them. 45 Only through the force of the
agreement does the judge have the authority to enforce the consent
decree. This power depends on the nature of the consent decree as
a contract. Judge Frank Easterbrook has said:
To take seriously the proposition that the decree depends on
consent is to require the court to ask whether the consent is
authoritative .... The logical question is whether a person
making a contractual undertaking to settle a case has the au-
thority to enter into the contract. If he does, the consent is
effective. If he does not, the noncontract does not get any ad-
ditional force by being filed with a court.46
Parties to a consent decree that purports to bind local legislators
include a plaintiff (perhaps the federal government or a private
party) and a local governmental body. As we have seen, neither of
these parties has the authority to waive or abrogate the immunity
of an individual legislator. When a consent decree attempts to
waive this immunity it is not "authoritative" and is a
"noncontract."
Li order to waive legislative immunity, therefore, the party
who waives it must have the authority to do so. The existence of a
consent decree does not obviate the need for proper authority.
Even in instances where the immunity is unaffected by the consent
decree, it seems unlikely that legislators have the authority to
"bargain away" their power to vote for legislation. 4 To avoid the
problem of binding legislators, local government consent decrees
should only contain agreements to execute (e.g., to build a certain
number of buildings), and not agreements to legislate (e.g., to pass
a law that would enact building proposals).148 Agreements to exe-
"' Id at 529.
146 Frank H. Easterbrook, Justice and Contract in Consent Judgments, 1987 U Chi
Legal F 19, 35.
1' See Jeremy A. Rabkin and Neal E. Devins, Averting Government by Consent De-
cree: Constitutional Limits on the Enforcement of Settlements with the Federal Govern-
ment, 40 Stan L Rev 203, 213-214 (1987), explaining that legislatures cannot "bargain away"
sovereign powers (citations omitted).
48 But see id at 228-242, asserting that not all executive authority can be bargained
away. See generally Michael W. McConnell, Why Hold Elections? Using Consent Decrees to
Insulate Policies From Political Change, 1987 U Chi Legal F 295.
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cute do not need to include legislative promises, and hence do not
affect the privilege of a legislator to vote. In mixed forms of gov-
ernment, such as a city council that performs both executive and
legislative functions, the local body could agree to perform execu-
tive tasks. If the city fails to comply, the judge could enforce the
judgment against it and against any individual who fails to carry
out an executive duty. In this way, a judge could order action (ei-
ther from a litigated judgment or from a consent decree) without
affecting the freedom of legislators to speak and deliberate about
issues. Whereas consent decrees to legislate may be short cuts to
the execution of a plan, they ignore the legislative immunities and
lawful mechanisms that intervene.
B. A Consent Decree Must Not Violate the Law
A federal court has the power to enforce a consent decree, yet
this power only exists "to the extent that [the agreement] is not
otherwise shown to be unlawful .... ."14 9 Because the consent decree
"is an exercise of federal power, enforceable by contempt," the
court must ensure that "the decree is consistent with the Constitu-
tion and laws, does not undermine the rightful interests of third
parties, and is an appropriate commitment of the court's limited
resources."'5 0 The court must "scrutin[ize]" the consent decree to
ensure that it is "fair, adequate, and reasonable.' 151
The threshold issue, therefore, is whether the consent decree
violates the law. One aspect of this problem is whether the parties
had authority to waive legislative immunity. In Kasper v Bd. of
Election Com'rs of City of Chicago, the Seventh Circuit noted that
"[s]ome rules of law are designed to limit the authority of public
officeholders, to make them return to other branches of govern-
ment or to the voters for permission to engage in certain acts.' 1 52
Legislative immunity is just such a rule of law. None of the parties
has the right to make such an agreement; only the people can
waive the public right of legislative immunity. A consent decree
that contains an agreement to legislate is unlawful because it binds
each individual legislator to vote a certain way. Not only does it
149 Local Number 93, 478 US at 523, 526.
"5 Kasper v Bd. of Election Com'rs of City of Chicago, 814 F2d 332, 338 (7th Cir 1987).
"s Ibarra v Texas Employment Commission, 823 F2d 873, 878 (5th Cir 1987). The
court used Texas contract law to invalidate the decree on account of "mistake." Id at 879.
,51 814 F2d at 341, quoting Dunn v Carey, 808 F2d 555, 560 (7th Cir 1986). Kasper
differs from Yonkers in that the consent decree involved circumvention of explicit statutory
requirements, rather than common law.
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require an action that only the people and the individual legisla-
tor's conscience should compel, but it allows a court to impose lia-
bility upon any legislator who refuses to vote according to the dic-
tates of the decree.
As part of the analysis of the lawfulness of a decree, a court
must also consider the legal effect of the decree on third parties.
As a type of judgment, a consent decree is binding on all parties,
but like a settlement, it cannot settle any claims of or "impose du-
ties or obligations on a third party, without that party's agree-
ment. 15 3 In the Yonkers case, the city agreed to the consent de-
cree, and the councilmen voted to approve the decree by a majority
vote.15 The councilmen, however, were not parties to the decree.
One councilman voted against approval of the consent decree and
subsequently against the legislation to enact the housing plan. 5
Even though he had never voted for any of the agreements, the
councilman was found in contempt for not legislating pursuant to
the decree. 56 Evidently, the court decided that there was no dis-
tinction between the city and any of the councilmen. 57
The identification of councilmembers as parties separate from
their city seems necessary if a judge intends to single them out as
targets for coercive enforcement. The interests of each municipal
legislator, after all, are not identical to those of a city. His or her
constituency may hold opinions that differ from those of the body
as a whole. In a consent decree between a city and another party,
therefore, an individual councilman is better characterized as a
third party rather than as an alter-ego of the city.
If a legislator is bound as an individual, is the consent decree
lawful? The decree is understood as a contract, and its legality de-
pends on terms that are acceptable to all parties, including the in-
dividual councilmen. If the city alone represents the interests of
the municipality, then a judge can enforce the judgment only
against the city.' 58 If, on the other hand, both the city and the
individual legislators are parties, then it seems that all must con-
sent to the decree before it is effective against all of them. 59 Only
"5 Local Number 93, 478 US at 529.
15 856 F2d at 448; McFadden, NY Times 36 (Sept 11, 1988) (cited in note 6).
856 F2d at 457.
15 Id.
157 Spallone, 109 S Ct at 16, 17.
15 "[O]nly the parties to the decree can be held in contempt of court for failure to
comply with its terms." Local Number 93, 478 US at 530, citing United States v Armour &
Co., 402 US 673, 676-677 (1971).
"5' "[O]f course, a court may not enter a consent decree that imposes obligations on a
19891 1147
The University of Chicago Law Review
when the individual legislators are named as parties should the
judge have the authority to enforce the decree against them indi-
vidually.160 Municipal legislators, as separate parties who are pur-
portedly bound by a decree, may intervene and assert their own
and the people's common law rights. They could then ask the court
to judge the validity of their immunity or to modify the consent
decree to specifically protect their privilege.161
Even though the legislators could intervene in a case to pro-
tect their privileges, their lack of intervention does not prevent
them from asserting their rights in a different action. In Martin v
Wilks the Court recently held that nonparties to a consent decree
cannot be barred from collaterally attacking the decree.162 In Mar-
tin, the parties to the underlying suit had agreed to consent de-
crees that provided for hiring and promotion goals to correct past
discrimination in the Birmingham, Alabama, fire department.1 63 A
group of white firefighters sued the city and the county personnel
board in federal court. They alleged that they were being "denied
promotions in favor of less qualified blacks in violation of federal
law. 1 6 4 The District Court dismissed their claim on the basis that
third parties could not challenge the consent decrees that man-
dated the promotion plan. The Eleventh Circuit reversed and held
that the white firefighters could not be barred from attacking the
decree since they were not parties to its formation." 5 The Supreme
Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit's opinion and allowed the
challenge by the nonparties to the original consent decrees. The
Court reasoned: "A voluntary settlement in the form of a consent
decree between one group of employees and their employer cannot
possibly 'settle,' voluntarily or otherwise, the conflicting claims of
another group of employees who do not join in the agreement." '6
If the court in Yonkers was correct in holding that the consent
decree bound the legislators, the liability of the individual council-
party that did not consent to the decree." Local Number 93, 478 US at 530 (citations
omitted).
160 See id at 529. Parties "may'not impose duties or obligations on a third party, with-
out that party's agreement."
"I A third party "does not have power to block the decree merely by withholding its
consent," but the consent decree "cannot dispose of the valid claims of nonconsenting inter-
venors." Id.
162 109 S Ct 2180, 2183, 2188 (1989).
163 Id at 2183.
164 Id.
16 In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment Litigation, 833 F2d 1492,
1498-1500 (11th Cir 1987).
166 109 S Ct at 2188.
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men was entirely foreseeable. This predictability might require
that the councilmen be joined as parties to the action.8 7 Douglas
Laycock argues that "courts should not enter consent decrees with-
out the consent of all the foreseeable parties whose arguable legal
rights are directly affected. ' 16 8 If the courts fail to join these fore-
seeable parties, however, the decree has no effect on them, because
"[iut is simply beyond the power of the court" to bind them.169 The
Court in Martin made it clear that the presence of a consent de-
cree does not mandate the intervention by third parties: "Joinder
as a party, rather than knowledge of a lawsuit and an opportunity
to intervene, is the method by which potential parties are sub-
jected to the jurisdiction of the court and bound by a judgment or
decree.' ' 7 0 The councilmen in Yonkers were bound by the consent
decree at the very least when they were held in contempt for non-
compliance.' 7 ' Following Martin they "cannot be deprived of
[their] legal rights in a proceeding to which" they were not par-
ties.17 2 Furthermore, even if they failed to intervene in the original
suit, they did not lose their right to challenge the decree.7 3
C. Consent Decrees that Abrogate Legislative Immunity are Un-
lawful and Without Authority, Hence Ineffective
If a judge approves an agreement to legislate and the legislator
refuses to comply, the resulting enforcement through contempt ef-
fectively is a coercion to legislate. Consequently, when a judge en-
forces the consent decree against a municipal legislator, that legis-
lator may be able to challenge the consent decree directly. 7 4 The
court then should either find that the privilege of the legislator
117 Id at 2186. See also Douglas Laycock, Consent Decrees Without Consent: The
Rights of Nonconsenting Third Parties 1987 U Chi Legal F 103, 129 (proposes joinder if
third party is foreseeable).
16 Id at 154.
1 Id at 104, 112-128. See Local Number 93, 478 US at 529; Firefighters v Stotts, 467
US 561, 588 and n 3 (1984) (O'Connor concurring), stating that if a party is "required to
make any sacrifices in the final consent decree, [it] must be represented and have had full
participation rights in the negotiation process."
170 Martin, 109 S Ct at 2186.
171 The Second Circuit stated that the Yonkers City Council became bound when it
"approved the terms of the Consent Judgment" by a vote in the council. The court also held
that even the member who did not vote for the measure was bound. Yonkers, 856 F2d at
457.
17M Martin, 109 S Ct at 2183.
173 Id at 2185-86.
174 Id. See also Local Number 93, 478 US at 529; Larry Kramer, Consent Decrees and
the Rights of Third Parties, 87 Mich L Rev 321, 331-332 (1988), advocating that a party
should be able to intervene.
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must be protected pursuant to the common law or that the legisla-
tor is not bound by the decree since he or she was not a party to
the agreement. 17 5
A municipal legislator should not have to wait until the threat
of contempt is imminent. Uncertainty of liability would have a
chilling effect on legislation. A councilmember would have to live
and work with the knowledge that his or her right to legislate
freely would be challenged if the judge's decree failed to achieve a
majority vote in the council. Rather than cast a tenuous vote, a
councilmember contemplating a vote against a measure advocated
by a consent decree would probably prefer to intervene in the fed-
eral court prior to the imposition of the decree. The Yonkers case,
moreover, makes the threat of action against a legislator more
likely. After Yonkers, a councilmember has to worry that if he or
she fails to assert this right-if perchance a majority of the council
decides to vote against the judicially ordered legislation-he or she
could face a contempt judgment. A legi lator should, therefore,
challenge any agreement that includes a promise to legislate. The
mere presence of a consent decree does not prevent a challenge
and does not abrogate the right of the legislator to vote freely.
If consent decrees are to continue as an effective method of
resolution, a judge must ensure that those involving cities do not
purport to waive the immunity of local legislators. If legislative
privilege is not protected, the decree is unlawful, and the federal
judge has no authority over the councilmembers. Congress has not
waived the common' law protection,7 6 and the council as a whole
cannot independently: waive its immunity.17 7 In short, a court
should not approve a. onsent decree that brings the basic freedom
of the legislative -piokess under the coercive powers of the
judiciary.
VI. CONCLUSION
The history of legislative immunity reveals its purpose: to
guarantee a free representative form of government by assuring
free deliberation and accountability. The people as the sovereign
authority for the government possess the right of free speech or
debate for their elected. voice in government. They retain this
right, and neither the legislator nor the representative body can
175 Martin, 109 S Ct at 2188, citing Local Number 93, 478 US at 529.
27 Consumers Union, 446 US 719, 732, 738 (1980).
177 See text accompanying notes 131-34.
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waive it without the consent of the people. Even the slightest
waiver of legislative immunity constitutes an alteration of the form
of government chosen by the people, for a government that forces
representatives to vote a certain way transforms the legislative
process into an executive function.
If legislative immunity can be waived at all, it must be done
through the process by which lawful change in the form of govern-
ment can be made. In the case of municipalities, states may have
the authority to alter the form of local government. Congress may
also have this authority, but it has never shown any intent to abro-
gate the common law immunity. If any party abrogates the privi-
lege, the representative nature of the lawmaking power is
diminished.
Even if Congress has the power to order an individual city
councilmember to vote for legislation, it should not use this power
lightly, because it may violate the common law rights of the indi-
viduals and of the people. There are, after all, other means to exact
the same result from a government body without denying the im-
munity. Once the fines against the councilmen were abated in Yon-
kers, the action taken against the city worked,17 8 as it has in all
other like cases.
A consent decree cannot alter the privilege of legislators. In
order for the decree to have the lawful power to abrogate the im-
munity of municipal councilmembers, one of the parties to the de-
cree must have the right to waive the privilege. The Yonkers court
did not decide whether the parties had the authority to waive the
immunity, but rather assumed that the consent decree effected a
waiver. 17 9 When the privilege is threatened, individual legislators
have the right to challenge such a decree and to assert that it is
unlawful. If a court decides that a decree does not purport to waive
legislative privilege, it may still coerce the governmental body to
execute the decree. It can force a city-but not the legislators-to
act. If on the other hand a court finds that the decree attempts to
waive legislative immunity, it should find that the decree is with-
out authority and must not be enforced."
Courts that abrogate the immunity of local legislators threaten
the legislative process. Even in the guise of enacting beneficial leg-
175 McFadden, NY Times 36 (Sept 11, 1988) (cited in note 6).
179 The Second Circuit stated, "[e]ven if we assume ... that city council members enjoy
the same immunity available to state legislators, we would seriously doubt that such immu-
nity insulates them from district court orders requiring them to comply with remedial de-
crees . . . ." Yonkers, 856 F2d at 456.
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islation, any court's intrusion into the deliberative process of a leg-
islative body is undesirable. The essential values of our representa-
tive form of government are seriously challenged when a judge
holds the spokespersons in government personally liable for their
speech or debate-the "ancient privilege" of the people.
